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RECOVERING TECH’S HUMANITY 
Olivier Sylvain *  
INTRODUCTION  
Tim Wu’s essay, Will Artificial Intelligence Eat the Law?, posits that 
automated decisionmaking systems may be taking the place of human 
adjudication in social media content moderation. Conventional adjudi-
cative processes, he explains, are too slow or clumsy to keep up with the 
speed and scale of online information flows. Their eclipse is imminent, 
inevitable, and, he concludes, just as well.1 
Wu’s essay does not really indulge in the romantic tropes about cy-
borg robot overlords, nor does he seem to hold a conceit about the 
superiority of networked technologies. He does not promise, for exam-
ple, anything similar to Mark Zuckerberg’s prophecy to Congress in 
spring 2018 that artificial intelligence would soon cure Facebook of its 
failings in content moderation.2 To the contrary, Wu here is sober about 
the private administration of consumer information markets. After all, he 
has been among the most articulate proponents of positive government 
regulation in this area for almost two decades. The best we can do, Wu 
argues, is create hybrid approaches that carefully integrate artificial 
intelligence into the content moderation process.3 
But in at least two important ways, Wu’s essay masks important chal-
lenges. First, by presuming the inevitability of automated decisionmaking 
systems in online companies’ distribution of user-generated content and 
data, Wu obscures the indispensable role that human managers at the 
Big Tech companies have in developing and selecting their business de-
signs, algorithms, and operational techniques for managing content 
distribution.4 These companies deploy these resources to further their 
                                                                                                                           
*  Professor of Law, Fordham Law School.  
 1. Tim Wu, Will Artificial Intelligence Eat the Law? The Rise of Hybrid Social-
Ordering Systems, 119 Colum. L. Rev. 2001, 2001–02 (2019) [hereinafter Wu, AI Eat the 
Law]. 
 2. Sarah Jeong, AI Is an Excuse for Facebook to Keep Messing Up, The Verge (Apr. 
13, 2018), https://www.theverge.com/2018/4/13/17235042/facebook-mark-zuckerberg-
ai-artificial-intelligence-excuse-congress-hearings [https://perma.cc/6JB6-NJSG]. 
 3. Wu, AI Eat the Law, supra note 1, at 2001–05. 
 4. By Big Tech companies, I refer to the dozen or so internet companies that domi-
nate the networked information economy, but especially the “big five”: Facebook, 
Alphabet (the owner of Google), Microsoft, Amazon, and Apple. For the purposes of this 
Response, under this coinage, I also include Twitter, the social media company which, 
after Facebook-owned entities, has the second-largest U.S. user base. See J. Clement, Most 
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bottom-line interests in enlarging user engagement and dominating mar-
kets.5 In this way, social media content moderation is really only a tool for 
achieving these companies’ central objectives. Wu’s essay also says close 
to nothing about the various resources at work “behind the screens” that 
support this commercial mission.6 While he recognizes that tens of thou-
sands of human reviewers exist, for example, Wu downplays the compa-
nies’ role as managers of massive transnational production lines and em-
ployers of global labor forces. These workers and the proprietary 
infrastructure with which they engage are invaluable to the distribution 
of user-generated content and data. 
Second, the claim that artificial intelligence is eclipsing law is prema-
ture, if not just a little misleading. There is nothing inevitable about the 
private governance of online information flows when we do not yet know 
what law can do in this area. This is because courts have abjured their 
constitutional authority to impose legal duties on online intermediaries’ 
administration of third-party content. The prevailing judicial doctrine 
under section 230 of the Communications Act (as amended by the 
Communications Decency Act)7 (section 230) allows courts to adjudicate 
the question of intermediary liability for user-generated content when 
the service at issue “contributes materially” to that content.8 This is to say 
that the common law has not had a meaningful hand in shaping 
intermediaries’ moderation of user-generated content because courts, 
citing section 230, have foresworn the law’s application. Defamation, 
fraud, and consumer protection law, for example, generally hold parties 
legally responsible for disseminating unlawful information that originates 
with third parties. But, under the prevailing section 230 doctrine, power-
ful companies like Facebook, Google, and Amazon do not have any legal 
obligation to block or remove user-generated content that they have no 
hand in “creat[ing]” or “develop[ing].”9 This is a standard that requires 
                                                                                                                           
Popular Social Networks in the United States in October 2018, Based on Active Monthly 
Users (in Millions), Statista, https://www.statista.com/statistics/247597/global-traffic-to-lead-
ing-us-social-networking-sites/ [https://perma.cc/3Z7L-R5FX] (last visited Sept. 26, 2019).  
 5. See Sarah T. Roberts, Behind the Screen: Content Moderation in the Shadows of 
Social Media 33–34 (2019) (discussing how “moderation and screening are crucial steps 
that protect [internet companies’] corporate or platform brand . . . and contribute posi-
tively to maintaining an audience of users willing to upload and view content on their 
sites”). 
 6. See id. at 34–35 (noting that while some content moderation is well suited for 
“machine-automated filtering,” the majority of such work requires human screeners that 
are “called upon to employ an array of high-level cognitive functions and cultural 
competencies to make decisions about their appropriateness for a site or platform”). 
 7. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012). 
 8. Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 
1157, 1168 (9th Cir. 2008); accord Jones v. Dirty World Entm’t Recordings LLC, 755 F.3d 
398, 410 (6th Cir. 2014) (describing Roommates.com as the “leading case” and applying the 
“contributes materially” standard); FTC v. Accusearch Inc., 570 F.3d 1187, 1200 (10th Cir. 
2009) (applying the “contributes materially” standard). 
 9. 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3). 
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a substantial amount of involvement on the part of online companies to 
justify liability. This is why it is not quite right to say, as Wu does here, that 
we are witnessing the retreat of judicial decisionmaking in this setting. 
There has never been the chance to see what even modest run-of-the-mill 
judicial adjudication of content moderation decisions looks like since 
Congress enacted section 230 over twenty years ago. 
The view of online content moderation that Wu advances here is 
pristine. Its exclusive focus on the ideal Platonic form of speech modera-
tion resonates with the view that the internet can be an open and free 
forum for civic republican deliberation.10 In this vein, he appeals to the 
healthy constitutional skepticism in the United States about government 
regulation of expressive conduct. One might associate his arguments 
here with other luminaries who have proposed that we use communica-
tion technologies to create opportunities for discovery and progress.11 
In any case, by presenting the issue of content moderation as a battle 
between human adjudication and artificial intelligence, Wu’s essay here 
fails to identify the industrial designs, regulatory arrangements, and hu-
man labor that have put the Big Tech companies in their position of con-
trol. It does not really engage the political economy and structural 
arrangements that constitute and condition online content moderation. 
I generally admire and subscribe to Wu’s various accounts and cri-
tiques of the networked information economy. He is a clear and eloquent 
spokesperson for why positive procompetitive regulation and consumer 
protection in communications markets are vital to the operation of 
democracy. I, therefore, take his recent essay, and its relatively light touch 
                                                                                                                           
 10. Compare Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of 
American Community 245–46 (2000) (noting that “the rise of electronic communications 
and entertainment,” especially television, coincided with “the national decline in social 
connectedness” and civic disengagement among younger generations, although the evi-
dence was not conclusive on causality), with Cass Sunstein, Republic.com 8–9, 167–70 
(2001) (suggesting that while technology has given more power to consumers “to filter 
what they see,” a “widely publicized deliberative domain[] on the Internet, ensuring 
opportunities for discussion among people with diverse views,” would aid in maintaining a 
“well-functioning system of free expression”). This approach also recalls far more theo-
retical treatments of “discourse ethics.” See generally Jurgen Habermas, Between Facts 
and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy (1996) (arguing 
for a shift from communicative to strategic action in which parties to a dispute spend less 
time debating validity claims and more time bargaining with threats and promises). 
 11. See Yochai Benkler, Wealth of Networks: How Social Production Transforms 
Markets and Freedom 2 (2006) (describing a “new information environment” in which 
users play “a more active role” and its potential to “serve as a platform for better demo-
cratic participation” and as a “mechanism to achieve improvements in human develop-
ment everywhere”); Lawrence Lessig, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace 7–8 (1999) 
(arguing that cyberspace as an open commons is key to checking government control and 
advocating for open code); Ithiel de Sola Pool, Technologies of Freedom 10 (1983) (“The 
onus is on us to determine whether free societies in the twenty-first century will conduct 
electronic communication under the conditions of freedom established for the domain of 
print through centuries of struggle, or whether that great achievement will become lost in 
a confusion about new technologies.”). 
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on the Big Tech companies’ content moderation choices, as being ad-
dressed to whom he says it is addressed: the designers of these new hy-
brid processes. In contrast, this Response is addressed to policymakers 
and reformers: the very people whom Wu has inspired with his other 
writing. I offer this caveat to say that Wu and I may not actually have a 
disagreement as a matter of substance. I will just use this generous oppor-
tunity to respond to his essay by identifying the reasons we cannot afford 
to turn away from the lived political economy that shapes our networked 
world. 
I. CODIFYING CONTENT MODERATION 
Communications law, Wu explains, has over the past two centuries 
calibrated the “implicit competition” between “private and public 
decisionmaking” and “norms and law.”12 In the United States, this bal-
ance has been informed in large part by the constitutional skepticism 
about government regulation of information flows.13 But the recent “arri-
val of software and artificial intelligence,” Wu explains, presents a “new” 
challenge to the old public–private equilibrium in communications pol-
icy.14 Today, a handful of powerful private online platforms employ tech-
nologies to harvest and redistribute an extraordinary amount of con-
sumer data.15 Common law adjudication, he concludes, cannot compete. 
This was not always the case. For the first decade or so after the com-
mercial deployment of the internet (say, from 1995 to 2010), online 
intermediaries were avowedly laissez faire about user-generated content. 
Twitter, for example, presented itself as the “free speech wing of the free 
                                                                                                                           
 12. Wu, AI Eat the Law, supra note 1, at 2006. 
 13. See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 874 (1997) (holding that provisions of the 
Communications Decency Act of 1996 were unconstitutional because they lacked “the 
precision that the First Amendment requires when a statute regulates the content of 
speech”); N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283 (1964) (requiring “proof of actual mal-
ice for an award of punitive damages” in libel actions “brought by public officials against 
critics of their official conduct”); see also Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 628 
(1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (noting that speech that does not pose an “immediate 
danger” or “hinder the success of the government arms” should be protected by free 
speech rights and that such principles do not change during times of war). 
 14. Wu, AI Eat the Law, supra note 1, at 2007. 
 15. I here want to associate myself with Tarleton Gillespie’s very helpful way of writing 
about platforms, now that the term has been divorced from its connotation among net-
work engineers. See Tarleton Gillespie, Custodians of the Internet: Platforms, Content 
Moderation, and the Hidden Decisions that Shape Social Media 18–23 (2018). 
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speech party.”16 Reddit purported to be the uncensored “front page of 
the Internet,” warts and all.17 
It was an exciting time for entrepreneurs and free speech advocates. 
The most outspoken proponents of the new technology were bullish 
about the ways in which the new information technology would disrupt 
markets, governments, and all kinds of centralized power.18 They gener-
ally believed that the internet was a democratizing communication plat-
form that would empower “users” to articulate themselves in ways that 
incumbent telecommunications and media companies made impossi-
ble.19 This strong argument for unfettered networked communications 
resonated with the deregulatory, free-market worldview among main-
stream politicians in both parties and policy elites from the 1980s into 
the mid-2000s. The language its proponents used could easily be associ-
ated, for example, with President Bill Clinton’s declaration in his 1996 
State of the Union address that “the era of big government is over.”20 
Writers and scholars often refer to John Perry Barlow’s powerful 
Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace—a magnificent artifact of the 
Davos neoliberal consensus of the day.21 Also significant is Cyberspace and 
                                                                                                                           
 16. Josh Halliday, Twitter’s Tony Wang: ‘We Are the Free Speech Wing of the Free Speech 
Party,’ Guardian (Mar. 22, 2012), https://www.theguardian.com/media/2012/mar/22/ 
twitter-tony-wang-free-speech [https://perma.cc/7GBW-RKX3]. 
 17. John-Michael Bond, Understanding Reddit: A Beginner’s Guide to the Front 
Page of the Internet, Daily Dot (Sept. 2, 2018), https://www.dailydot.com/debug/what-is-
reddit/ [https://perma.cc/4NX2-9DPA]; Jake Widman & Will Nicol, What Is Reddit? A 
Beginner’s Guide to the Front Page of the Internet, Dig. Trends (May 22, 2019), 
https://www.digitaltrends.com/web/what-is-reddit/ [https://perma.cc/9WSE-ZBEL]. 
 18. See, e.g., Benkler, supra note 11, at 460–73 (concluding that the economic im-
pact of massive changes in information technology attenuates the power of traditional 
media institutions to mediate the public sphere, providing the opportunity to enhance 
democracy and individual autonomy); Clay Shirky, Here Comes Everybody: The Power of 
Organizing Without Organizations 21–24 (2008) (“Now that there is competition to tradi-
tional institutional forms for getting things done, those institutions will continue to exist, 
but their purchase on modern life will weaken as novel alternatives for group action 
arise.”). 
 19. See, e.g., Benkler, supra note 11, at 465 (“The emergence of a networked public 
sphere is attenuating, or even solving, the most basic failings of the mass-mediated public 
sphere. . . . The views of many more individuals and communities can be heard.”). 
 20. See Alison Mitchell, State of the Union: The Overview; Clinton Offers Challenge 
to Nation, Declaring, ‘Era of Big Government Is Over,’ N.Y. Times (Jan. 24, 1996), 
https://www.nytimes.com/1996/01/24/us/state-union-overview-clinton-offers-challenge-
nation-declaring-era-big.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
 21. John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace, Elec. 
Frontier Found. (Feb. 8, 1996), https://www.eff.org/cyberspace-independence [https:// 
perma.cc/2W4F-RXSA] (declaring that obsolete governments of the world will fail to con-
trol a new cyberspace civilization); see also Andy Greenberg, It’s Been 20 Years Since This Man 
Declared Cyberspace Independence, WIRED (Feb. 8, 2016), https://www.wired.com/ 
2016/02/its-been-20-years-since-this-man-declared-cyberspace-independence/ [https:// 
perma.cc/3LE7-DZDJ] (reflecting on how Barlow’s early manifesto has aged and reporting that 
“in recent years, Barlow admits his ideas have become less commonly used as a call to arms than 
as a political punching bag”). 
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the American Dream, authored by celebrated futurists and entrepreneurs 
of the time, which claimed that the popular adoption of the internet 
would make governments less relevant to public life.22 This, they wrote, 
“is an inevitable implication of the transition from the centralized power 
structures of the industrial age to the dispersed, decentralized institu-
tions” of the networked world.23 
During this period, courts, too, were generally pretty solicitous of 
the new technology.24 In Reno v. ACLU, the Supreme Court remarked that 
the internet was a “dynamic, multifaceted category of communication” 
that exceeded anything humanity had experienced before.25 It, Justice 
John Paul Stevens wrote for the Court, could transform “any person with 
a phone line” into “a town crier with a voice that resonates farther than it 
could from any soapbox.”26 
But things have evidently changed over the past decade or so. Above 
all, as Wu powerfully explains in his recent book, only a handful of firms 
control the ways in which the vast majority of information flows to users 
around the world.27 Amazon, Microsoft, Apple, Alphabet (the owner of 
Google), and Facebook sit atop the list of such companies based on mar-
ket capitalization, along with Netflix and Chinese giants Alibaba and 
Tencent.28 Facebook (the owner of Instagram and WhatsApp) generates 
about half the market value of what Microsoft or Amazon do, but its 
reach to users around the world is unrivaled.29 I have been using the 
shorthand “Big Tech companies” to identify them.30 As a result, these 
companies, as well as other popular moderators of user-generated con-
tent like Twitter and Reddit, have become the de facto arbiters of content 
                                                                                                                           
 22. Esther Dyson, George Gilder, George Keyworth & Alvin Toffler, Cyberspace and 
the American Dream: A Magna Carta for the Knowledge Age, 12 Info. Soc’y 295, 297 
(1996). 
 23. Id. at 303. 
 24. See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870, 874 (1997) (holding that provisions of 
the 1996 Communications Decency Act restricting indecent content on the internet vio-
lated the First Amendment); Zeran v. AOL, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997) (“By its 
plain language, § 230 [of the Communications Decency Act] creates a federal immunity to 
any cause of action that would make service providers liable for information originating 
with a third-party user of the service.”). 
25. 521 U.S. at 870. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Tim Wu, The Curse of Bigness: Antitrust in the New Gilded Age 11 (2018) 
[hereinafter Wu, Curse of Bigness]. 
 28. J. Clement, Market Capitalization of the Biggest Internet Companies Worldwide as of 
June 2019 (in Billion U.S. Dollars), Statista, https://www.statista.com/statistics/277483/market-
value-of-the-largest-internet-companies-worldwide/ [https://perma.cc/669Y-DJ6M] (last 
visited Aug. 28, 2019). 
 29. J. Clement, Most Popular Social Networks Worldwide as of July 2019, Ranked by 
Number of Active Users (in Millions), Statista (July 22, 2019), https://www.statista.com/ 
statistics/272014/global-social-networks-ranked-by-number-of-users/ [https://perma.cc/64EB-
SBTQ] (last visited Sept. 18, 2019). 
 30. See supra note 4. 
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online. Society has come a long way from the democratic view of the 
internet that prevailed in its nascent period. 
And, as concentrated as the social media market has become, the 
Big Tech companies have become more competitive about the size of the 
audiences they reach. It is largely in service of this market pressure that 
they have sought to create “healthy” environments for speech.31 To Wu, 
there are three reasons that online platforms have become more atten-
tive to content.32 First, activists of the past decade have raised general 
awareness about the material harms that some kinds of expressive con-
duct exact on historically subordinated groups.33 Second, the major plat-
forms have done more to limit or block the dissemination of “hateful 
speech, foreign interference with elections, atrocity propaganda, and 
hoaxes.”34 This second concern does not arise from wariness about harm 
to marginalized groups but rather from the damage that users believe 
social media distribution of “disinformation” has wrought on democra-
cies across the globe.35 
The third and final reason for the current state of affairs, according 
to Wu, has been the aggressive consolidation of the online “speech plat-
form market” by Big Tech.36 It is little surprise that Wu asserts as much 
here. He has been among the most articulate advocates of aggressive 
antitrust regulation of communications markets. These powerful 
intermediaries, he observes here, now decide in the first instance which 
kinds of content get distributed to subscribers.37 They do this at remarka-
ble speeds and with increasing precision. Thus, as Wu puts it, “[W]hat 
might have been thought to be important public decisions have either 
been displaced or are beginning to be displaced by software, in whole or 
in part,” by the sheer force of this enlarged technological capacity.38 In 
this way, online platforms, especially those administered by the Big Tech 
companies, have effectively supplanted the role of judges and legislatures 
                                                                                                                           
 31. See Isaac Chotiner, The Underworld of Online Content Moderation, New Yorker 
(July 5, 2019), https://www.newyorker.com/news/q-and-a/the-underworld-of-online-con-
tent-moderation [https://perma.cc/34R7-YCMS] (interviewing Sarah T. Roberts, author 
of Behind the Screen, supra note 5, who argues that the purpose of content moderation is 
for brand management of social media platforms and not a genuine interest in healthier 
online environments for speech). 
 32. Wu, AI Eat the Law, supra note 1, at 2010. 
 33. Id. at 2011–12. 
 34. Id. at 2010. 
 35. See Siva Vaidhyanathan, Antisocial Media: How Facebook Disconnects Us and 
Undermines Democracy 5 (2018) (“The dominance of Facebook on our screens, in our 
lives, and over our minds has many dangerous aspects. . . . We’ve seen this in post-election 
stories about the flurry of ‘fake news,’ which is actually just one form of information 
‘pollution.’”). 
 36. Wu, AI Eat the Law, supra note 1, at 2010–11. 
 37. Id. at 2013–18. 
 38. Id. at 2007. 
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as policymakers.39 Today, the Big Tech companies are increasingly relying 
on “proactive filters which prevent certain forms of content from being 
posted at all.”40 They have employed screening systems for the detection 
of the dissemination of child pornography, terrorist conspiracies, and the 
unauthorized distribution of copyright-protected works.41 In Wu’s ac-
count, algorithms now govern online information flows on social media. 
II. HUMAN–TECH HYBRIDS 
There can be little doubt that, today, automated decisionmaking sys-
tems are everywhere and deeply affecting. Some have been around for 
decades in, say, air-flight and traffic-light management.42 Others, like 
algorithms for pretrial risk assessment and secondary school placement, 
are of relatively recent vintage, even if not brand new.43 Today, most of us 
rely on automated decisionmaking systems for our quotidian online exist-
ence—through recommendations, news feeds, stories, and advertisements. 
The business models that sustain the most successful platforms rely 
on such systems to solicit, harvest, collect, analyze, sort, and repurpose 
massive amounts of consumer data.44 These same companies rely on simi-
lar automated decisionmaking systems to filter out and take down illegal, 
unauthorized, or offensive material. Last year, Twitter publicly an-
nounced its initiative to promote “healthier” dialogue on its site by using 
screening technologies to block or substantially reduce election med-
                                                                                                                           
 39. These developments, Wu observes, vindicate Lawrence Lessig’s prediction twenty 
years ago that the internet would reveal the indispensable role that “code” (shorthand for 
what we now colloquially refer to as “algorithms”) would have in regulating people’s 
online conduct. See id. 
 40. Id. at 2016–17. 
 41. Id. 
 42. See, e.g., Clay McShane, The Origins and Globalization of Traffic Control Signals, 
25 J. Urb. Hist. 379, 385 (1999) (describing the rapid adoption of automatic traffic lights 
in American cities and London during the 1920s); Now—The Automatic Pilot, Popular 
Sci. Monthly, Feb. 1930, at 22 (reporting on an early automatic flight mechanism that kept 
a plane flying for three hours without human control on a 1930 flight from Ohio to 
Washington, D.C.). 
 43. See Virginia Eubanks, Automating Inequality: How High-Tech Tools Profile, 
Police, and Punish the Poor 3 (2018) (“[W]e have ceded much of [our] decision-making 
power to sophisticated machines. Automated eligibility systems, ranking algorithms, and 
predictive risk models control which neighborhoods get policed, which families attain 
needed resources, who is short-listed for employment, and who is investigated for fraud.”). 
 44. Frank Pasquale, The Black Box Society: The Secret Algorithms that Control 
Money and Information 3 (2015) (“Everything we do online is recorded . . . . Surveillance 
cameras, data brokers, sensor networks, and ‘supercookies’ record how fast we drive, what 
pills we take, what books we read, what websites we visit.”); Tim Wu, The Attention 
Merchants: The Epic Scramble to Get Inside Our Heads 211 (2016) [hereinafter Wu, 
Attention Merchants] (“Years before Facebook or Google undertook a similar mission, 
AOL’s business team also began coming up with ways to cash in on the ‘big data’ they had 
collected: that is, the addresses, phone numbers, and credit card numbers of millions of 
users.”). 
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dling, harassment, user-bot activity, and general scams.45 Similarly, last 
March, in response to lawsuits, Facebook announced that it would rely 
on new filters to block the distribution of advertisements in housing, 
employment, and credit markets that violate civil rights laws.46 This came 
within months of the social media giant’s announcement that it would 
use surveys to tweak its News Feed and promote more meaningful 
engagement among users.47 And, just this summer, Facebook and its sis-
ter social media service, Instagram, announced that they would use new 
screening tools to limit the advertisement and sale of alcohol and to-
bacco products, including e-cigarettes.48 
As pervasive as automated screening technologies are, however, we 
have not been completely overtaken by them just yet. Human resources 
remain vitally important to when and how the major platforms publicly 
distribute user-generated content because, as of now, automated screen-
ing technologies are just not good enough to make sense of the massive 
amount of content that flows through their servers. As information stud-
ies scholar Sarah Roberts puts it in her account of the political economy 
of content moderation, “[T]he complex process of sorting user-uploaded 
material into either the acceptable or the rejected pile is far beyond the 
capabilities of software or algorithms alone.”49 This is why, in all of the 
instances identified above, the companies also rely on people to correct 
oversights, redress algorithmic biases, and clean up other mistakes the 
screening technologies make.50 
In fact, the Big Tech companies have relied on human resources to 
moderate user-generated content since the mid-2000s. The largest plat-
forms, for example, have long called on their own users to flag or report 
                                                                                                                           
 45. Louise Matsakis, What Would a ‘Healthy’ Twitter Even Look Like?, WIRED (Mar. 1, 
2018), https://www.wired.com/story/what-would-healthy-twitter-look-like/ [https://perma.cc/ 
PS6E-3R4P]. 
 46. Katie Paul, Facebook Agrees to Advertising Overhaul to Settle U.S. 
Discrimination Suits, Reuters (Mar. 19, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
facebook-advertisers/facebook-agrees-to-advertising-overhaul-to-settle-u-s-discrimination-
suits-idUSKCN1R02CO [https://perma.cc/T2Q2-PCKU]. 
 47. Ramya Sethuraman, Jordi Vallmitjana & Jon Levin, Using Surveys to Make News 
Feeds More Personal, Facebook Newsroom (May 16, 2019), https://newsroom.fb.com/ 
news/2019/05/more-personalized-experiences/ [https://perma.cc/ZA6L-679H]. 
 48. David Cohen, People Can No Longer Sell or Exchange Alcohol and Tobacco 
Products on Facebook and Instagram, Adweek (July 24, 2019), https://www.adweek.com/ 
digital/people-can-no-longer-sell-or-exchange-alcohol-and-tobacco-products-on-facebook-and-
instagram/ (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
 49. Roberts, supra note 5, at 34. 
 50. Arman Azad, First on CNN: Facebook and Instagram to Restrict Content Related to 
Alcohol, Tobacco and e-Cigarettes, CNN (July 24, 2019), https://amp.cnn.com/cnn/2019/ 
07/24/health/facebook-instagram-alcohol-tobacco-bn/index.html [https://perma.cc/3U73-
W5HM] (explaining that, in order to implement its new alcohol and tobacco rule, 
Facebook will “use a combination of technology, human review and reports from our 
community to find and remove any content that violates these policies”). 
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content that violates content guidelines.51 The companies then employ vast 
global workforces to check on this flagged content.52 Today, Facebook and 
Google each employ tens of thousands of salaried workers and 
contractors around the world who review user-reported material.53 
Depending on the complexity or difficulty of knowing whether any given 
content should be blocked (think of the live stream of the Christchurch 
massacre or the doctored video clips of the Speaker of the House of 
Representatives Nancy Pelosi), these reviewers escalate evaluation 
through internal appellate processes that, in the hardest cases, might 
even culminate in a final decision at the highest levels of the company.54 
Human review is essential today because it confers a degree of legiti-
macy on the platforms’ moderation choices. For Wu, Facebook’s plans 
for an Oversight Board help to illustrate the point. Late last year, months 
after Facebook head Mark Zuckerberg hinted at it, the social media giant 
announced its plans for a transnational “Supreme Court” of sorts to rule 
on whether any especially controversial user-generated content should be 
taken down.55 Soon after, it released a draft charter and framework for 
the plan and sought out feedback from policymakers, activists, and users 
around the world.56 The company published the final charter in 
September of this year.57 While the fine details of its implementation re-
main uncertain, Facebook concluded that the Board is to be composed 
of forty independent experts from around the world.58 Each member will 
serve three-year terms and may serve a total of three terms if re-
appointed.59 The Board will develop its procedures.60 It will publish deci-
                                                                                                                           
 51. See, e.g., How to Report Things on Facebook, Facebook, https://www.facebook.com/ 
help/181495968648557 [https://perma.cc/744Y-D3FM] (last visited Aug. 28, 2019); Report 
Abusive Behavior, Twitter, https://help.twitter.com/en/safety-and-security/report-abusive-
behavior [https://perma.cc/7GUJ-ZZDD] (last visited Aug. 28, 2019). 
 52. Gillespie, supra note 15, at 117–24. 
 53. Roberts, supra note 5, at 1–2. 
 54. See Kate Klonick, Inside the Team at Facebook that Dealt with the Christchurch 
Shooting, New Yorker (Apr. 25, 2019), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/inside-
the-team-at-facebook-that-dealt-with-the-christchurch-shooting [https://perma.cc/EW6L-
KZVV]. 
 55. The idea has generally been attributed to Harvard Law professor Noah Feldman. See 
Mark Sullivan, Exclusive: The Harvard Professor Behind Facebook’s Oversight Board Defends 
Its Role, Fast Company (July 8, 2019), https://www.fastcompany.com/90373102/exclusive-the-
harvard-professor-behind-facebooks-oversight-board-defends-its-role [https://perma.cc/8UVH-
RPJ6]. 
 56. The company published a summary of the feedback received on the draft charter 
after conducting workshops and roundtables around the world during the first half of 2019. See 
Brent Harris, Global Feedback and Input on the Facebook Oversight Board for Content 
Decisions, Facebook Newsroom (June 27, 2019), https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2019/06/ 
global-feedback-on-oversight-board/ [https://perma.cc/VQL9-CNBM]. 
 57. Facebook, Oversight Board Charter (2019), https://fbnewsroomus.files.wordpress. 
com/2019/09/oversight_board_charter.pdf [https://perma.cc/6PHQ-HM34]. 
 58. Id. art. I, §§ 1–2. 
 59. Id. art. I, § 3.  
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sions on content, which must be supported by “plain language” explana-
tions.61 Over time, these decisions would ostensibly comprise a body of 
something like “law” for future Board decisionmaking. 
Observers have highlighted a variety of potential problems with the 
Board’s framework. Some are administrative: As in, how quickly will the 
Board be able to adjudicate especially inflammatory content like the 
livestream of the Christchurch massacre or the doctored Pelosi videos?62 
Waiting just minutes after the public release of such content is all a per-
son with just a few followers or connections needs to (innocently, 
mischievously, or malevolently) disseminate especially inflammatory con-
tent.63 Relatedly, will the Board have the capacity to redress different con-
troversies that simultaneously arise in different parts of the world? Other 
questions are related, but more substantive: As in, how could a forty-
member board be capable of authoritatively resolving regionally or 
culturally idiosyncratic controversies around the world?64  
These are altogether different from the existential question of what 
role Facebook (or any online platform) will in fact have in the Board’s 
governance.65 According to the Charter, the company will contract for 
the Board’s services,66 select the Board’s co-chairs,67 and establish an 
irrevocable trust for the compensation of its members and the provision 
of other financial support.68 The Charter provides that Facebook will be 
bound by the Board’s decisions in individual cases, but the company will 
                                                                                                                           
 60. Id. art. II, § 1. 
 61. Id. art. III, §§ 4, 6. 
 62. See, e.g., Melanie Ehrenkranz, Facebook Shares More Details About the 
Content Oversight Board You’ll Be Getting Pissed Off About in the Future, Gizmodo 
(Jan. 28, 2019), https://gizmodo.com/facebook-shares-more-details-about-the-content-
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will not be able to tackle the pressing day-to-day content monitoring issues on Facebook). 
 63. See, e.g., Klonick, supra note 54 (“While obvious bad actors were pushing the 
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the victims, or because of the video’s newsworthiness.”). 
 64. See, e.g., Max Read, Facebook Is Going to Have a Supreme Court. Will It Work?, N.Y. 
Mag.: Intelligencer (Jan. 30, 2019), http://nymag.com/intelligencer/2019/01/facebooks-new-
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posed board as being “ill-equipped” to address complex issues like Facebook’s role in ethnic 
cleansing in Myanmar). 
 65. See generally Glob. Partners Dig., A Rights-Respecting Model of Online Content 
Regulation by Platforms (2018), https://www.gp-digital.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/A-
rights-respecting-model-of-online-content-regulation-by-platforms.pdf [https://perma.cc/TF47-
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66. Facebook, supra note 57, at art. V, § 1. 
67. Id. art. I, § 8. 
68. Id. art. V, § 1–2. 
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not be bound by the Board’s advisory opinions about Facebook’s content 
policy.69 
We do not yet know, of course, how all of this will actually play out, 
but for Wu, the case of the Oversight Board illustrates the emergent “hy-
brid” approach to online content moderation; Facebook relies on auto-
mated screening technologies, user reports, and an elaborate process for 
human adjudication inside (and potentially outside) of the company to 
decide which user-generated content to distribute.70 This kind of overt 
human involvement, he explains, engenders “deeper acceptance and 
greater public satisfaction.”71 Perhaps this is because algorithmic 
decisionmaking systems typically do not explain their final decisions in 
language that most people understand.72 Or perhaps general ambiva-
lence about automated systems arises from artificial intelligence’s inabil-
ity (at least for now) to read social cues that, in real time among real peo-
ple, elicit trust.73 In any event, Wu observes, human oversight plainly pre-
                                                                                                                           
 69. Id. art. IV. 
 70. See Wu, AI Eat the Law, supra note 1, at 2018–20. 
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recalls what Professor Danielle Citron has called “technological due process.” See Danielle 
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Times: Room for Debate (July 29, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2014/ 
08/06/is-big-data-spreading-inequality/big-data-should-be-regulated-by-technological-due-
process [https://perma.cc/67PR-646L] (arguing for greater transparency into automated 
decisionmaking). For Citron, technological due process requires democratic oversight of 
algorithmic decisionmaking, including transparency and routine auditing by government 
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 73. Professors Brett Frischmann and Evan Selinger speculate about the variety of 
sociological and psychological hurdles that stand in the way of accepting the wide deploy-
ment of “techno-social systems,” including the difficulty for laypeople to understand how 
the technologies work. There are also general worries about the “tipping point” after 
which automated decisionmaking systems effectively colonize and substantially diminish 
human agency and freedom. See Brett Frischmann & Evan Selinger, Re-Engineering 
Humanity 10–11 (2018). Anyway, facial recognition technology is years away from helping 
on that front. See Woodrow Hartzog & Evan Selinger, Facial Recognition Is the Perfect 
Tool for Oppression, Medium (Aug. 2, 2018), https://medium.com/s/story/facial-recognition-
is-the-perfect-tool-for-oppression-bc2a08f0fe66 [https://perma.cc/8TH6-33UG]. Local 
governments have also been banning its use. See, e.g., J.E.F., Why San Francisco 
Banned the Use of Facial-Recognition Technology, Economist (May 16, 2019), https://www. 
economist.com/democracy-in-america/2019/05/16/why-san-francisco-banned-the-use-of-facial-
recognition-technology [https://perma.cc/9ZFS-RQ2F]; Sara Ravani, Oakland Bans Use of 
Facial Recognition Technology, Citing Bias Concerns, S.F. Chron. (July 17, 2019), 
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sents the distinctive advantage of “highly trained human judgment,” a 
feature that is sometimes at odds with or just orthogonal to the decisions 
that automated systems make in reliance on ex ante rules.74 This kind of 
reasonable common sense puts the relative equities in any given case into 
perspective in ways that hard-and-fast rules sometimes do not get right, 
but that good human judgment does. 
III. CONTENT MODERATION IS INDUSTRIAL DESIGN 
Wu’s account here is useful, but it significantly downplays the scope 
and depth of human involvement in the day-to-day political economy of 
content moderation at the Big Tech platforms. His essay is principally 
concerned with explaining the ways in which automated decisionmaking 
systems (ought to) interact with human judgment. Even on these terms, 
however, the current law does not create incentives that might influence 
the Big Tech’s industrial designs. Wu asks here: “Will Artificial 
Intelligence Eat the Law?” The inquiry is an alluring one for our times. 
But it obscures who and what is actually at work. 
Wu has been among the most effective chroniclers of the networked 
information economy for almost two decades.75 He and others, including 
Professors Siva Vaidhyanathan and Frank Pasquale, for example, have 
written compellingly about the ways in which the Big Tech companies are 
driven chiefly by a business model that relies on harvesting as much con-
sumer data as possible and using that data to optimize consumer engage-
ment.76 They do this in the name of increasing shareholder value.77 
This remains an important account. So, it is worth stating here 
plainly what Wu’s essay does not: The ambition to foster “healthy” online 
engagement, while more than an afterthought, is hardly the Big Tech 
companies’ main priority. These companies are not (and do not see 
themselves as) chiefly in the business of calibrating the right balance be-
tween human moderators and screening algorithms. Rather, their aim is 
to hold and expand their dominion over networked information flows. 
They protect this position by, among other things, developing products 
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that users cannot resist or acquiring rivals’ emergent services and prod-
ucts to avoid any contraction of their market share.78 They also routinely 
rely on intellectual property law (such as patent and trade secrets laws), 
worker contracts (such as nondisclosure and noncompete agreements), 
and a wide assortment of other legal tools to preserve control over their 
internal decisionmaking processes.79 And, besides all of this, they also 
appeal to the variety of governments and jurisdictions around the world 
where their users reside, including authoritarian regimes with no com-
punction about imposing restrictions on political speech.80 Artificial 
intelligence surely matters for content moderation. But, in light of all 
else that is at work, it is more likely an incident of these companies’ overt 
industrial designs on the control and consolidation of the distribution of 
user information. 
The idea that private corporations in the United States have incen-
tives for profit and control is not news. The political economy of media 
and communications markets over the past two centuries has generally 
turned on companies’ power to provide advertisers access to audiences.81 
As Wu himself has observed elsewhere, since at least the penny press, me-
dia companies have traded on their gatekeeper position for advertisers 
who want to reach users.82 One difference today is that online platforms 
have at their disposal powerful tools that track and predict each con-
sumer’s idiosyncratic behavior and preferences. They do this with much 
more precision and at greater scale than ever before. What is more, the 
platforms, especially the Big Tech companies, exploit the user data that 
they harvest to develop new services and products that keep their users 
engaged.83 Online platforms’ capacity for large-scale automated “micro-
targeting” paired with their ability to keep consumers’ attention has trig-
gered a paradigmatic shift in the media and communications ecosystem. 
Advertisers have flocked to online platforms (really, affiliate-advertising 
networks that track consumers’ behavior across sites on the web) at the 
expense of traditional brick-and-mortar media companies whose capacity 
to reach audiences is more speculative and far less fine-tuned.84 
                                                                                                                           
 78. See Lina M. Khan, Note, Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, 126 Yale L.J. 710, 752–55 
(2017) (describing Amazon’s business model, which relies on the indispensability of its 
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 79. Pasquale, supra note 44, at 3, 193. 
 80. Adrian Shahbaz, Freedom House, Freedom on the Net: The Rise of Digital 
Authoritarianism 11–15 (2018), https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/FOTN_ 
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 81. See Michael Schudson, Discovering the News: A Social History of American 
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 82. Wu, Attention Merchants, supra note 44, at 12. 
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This is why it is not exactly right to suggest, as Wu does in his essay, 
that algorithms are suppressing human adjudication.85 Automated screen-
ing technologies know nothing about it, as they are what Lewis Mumford 
a century ago called the mere “technics” that firm managers have chosen 
to deploy to enlarge their commercial reach and capacity to administer 
online user experiences.86 In this vein, policymakers ought to be eyeing, 
above all, the ways in which the Big Tech companies manipulate these 
tools to exploit their powerful market position between users and 
advertisers. Artificial intelligence and automated decisionmaking are not 
to blame. To be sure, those are important aspects of the current state of 
affairs. But the focus of policymakers and regulators should be on the Big 
Tech companies’ pecuniary objectives and the designs that they have 
chosen to use in service of those aims. 
These (very human) incentives to control and consolidate infor-
mation flows explain only a part of the political economy of social media 
content distribution. The vast infrastructure of hardware and labor “be-
hind the screen” are the indispensable resources on which these compa-
nies’ executives organize the content review process. They are assets that 
must be managed, and they represent costs that must be offset. It may be 
that the Big Tech companies have not been as deliberate as Frederick 
Taylor and other proponents of “scientific management” a century ago 
were about every detail in the production process.87 But the sequence of 
human resources that platforms devote to user-generated content review 
at the Big Tech companies—from automated screening, to users who flag 
objectionable content, to off-site content moderation contractors and 
review boards, to in-house reviewers—resembles a factory-floor produc-
tion line, albeit a transnational and virtual one.88 The ways in which the 
Big Tech companies organize all of these resources is central to under-
standing their distribution of user-generated content. 
For the past several years, a handful of intrepid scholars and journal-
ists have reported on the industrial design of the content review process 
at the Big Tech companies.89 The pace and quantity of critical writing on 
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this once-overlooked area have increased substantially over the past few 
months, signaling an important shift in the popular mind about the 
online platforms.90 This, by the way, is not an emergent field of inquiry 
that is limited to social media content moderation. Kate Crawford and 
Vladan Joler, for example, have mapped the resources and industrial pro-
cesses that power Amazon’s online retail business.91 In Anatomy of an AI 
System, which is part narrative and part graphic visualization, Crawford 
and Joler vividly describe the full range of infrastructures and processes 
that deliver products to users: from the Echo unit that sits in a living 
room, to the mines from which companies extract the rare earth ele-
ments of which fiber optic cables and satellites are built, to the working 
conditions at Amazon’s distribution centers.92 
More pertinently, in her new book Behind the Screen, Sarah Roberts 
provides perhaps the most comprehensive account of “industrial-scale” 
organized and professional content moderation.93 Key to her account is 
the human labor involved.94 And this is vitally important in light of Wu’s 
thesis. This workforce, she explains, brings “an array of high-level cogni-
tive functions and cultural competencies” that continues to elude auto-
mated decisionmaking systems.95 But, Roberts continues, this specific 
kind of “knowledge work” is difficult to the point of being traumatizing.96 
After all, these are the people who watch, categorize, take down, and 
block the worst kinds of content: graphic abuse of children, acts of self-
harm, gory war zone footage.97 This is unequivocally ugly and isolating, 
she explains.98 But someone has to do it if the internet is to be inviting 
for the vast majority of users. 
Meanwhile, the managers at the Big Tech companies responsible for 
managing this workforce are making “a business decision on the part of 
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the social media companies themselves.”99 The inclusion of human 
reviewers has never been, she explains, “a foregone conclusion based on 
technological necessity or other factors.”100 To the extent the workers 
committed to this are in-house, for example, executives at these compa-
nies will presumably consider resiliency trainings, in addition to 
infrastructures that support and guide workers who click through so 
much graphic content.101 The same kind of calculus guides managerial 
decisions about how many reviewers should be outside contractors, as 
opposed to in-house employees. Indeed, for managers of the content 
moderation process at the Big Tech companies, the choice to consign 
this difficult work to outside contractors is suggestive.102 First, as Roberts 
explains, by entering into short-term itinerant contracts with these work-
ers, the companies have tacitly acknowledged that any given person can-
not stay in the position for more than a couple years because of the 
trauma it causes;103 to include such workers within the salaried confines 
of the Big Tech firms would arguably alter those firms’ obligations to 
these workers.104 Second, the cost of labor for such work is simply 
cheaper in other parts of the world, largely because the host countries, 
mainly in East Asia, create incentives for transnational firms to locate 
their workers in industrial zones.105 At these sites, the companies enjoy 
“tax exemptions and other sweetheart economic terms that may also in-
clude relaxed labor laws or other incentives that leave workers and other 
citizens at a deficit.”106 
Wu’s essay needn’t delve into this detail. Again, his essay’s aim is to 
puzzle through whether and how human adjudication and artificial 
intelligence can interact.107 Thus, a reader might think that my point 
here about industrial designs is fussier or more rhetorical than illumina-
tive, particularly since Wu has elsewhere written extensively about the 
political economy of information markets.108 Or perhaps my intervention 
here just reflects a dispute over emphasis rather than substance. 
I insist that it does not. Wu’s essay makes the case that conventional 
forms of human decisionmaking are sometimes not as effective or 
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responsive as platforms’ automated screening techniques.109 But there is 
nothing inevitable or necessary about artificial intelligence’s place in the 
decisions that platforms make. Nor, to be plain, do such technologies 
matter in fact as much as he avers here. What matters most today are 
deeply human concerns: the political economy, geography, incentives, 
regulatory arrangements, and industrial designs that guide platforms’ 
decisions about when and how to employ different screening techniques. 
To put the point a little more starkly: Screening technologies do not 
make content distribution decisions. As rule-bound as they are, they do 
not eat anything they are told to leave alone. The question of how to 
structure online content moderation review processes is an industrial 
design question, not one for algorithms. 
IV. BIG TECH’S DESIGNS UNFETTERED BY LAW 
Focusing on the relative efficacy of artificial intelligence in content 
moderation (at the expense of human adjudication) is mistaken for an-
other important reason: It clouds extant obstacles to assigning legal re-
sponsibility to online intermediaries. The rise of automated decisionmak-
ing is not the main reason judicial adjudication has had little to no hand 
in regulating Big Tech’s publication and distribution of information. 
Section 230 doctrine is the reason that the courts have read the provision 
as blocking them from doing so. 
In 1996, Congress sought to ensure that “interactive computer ser-
vices” were “unfettered” by any legal obligation to publish user-gener-
ated content with section 230.110 The courts have read this charge to 
effectively immunize online platforms from liability for distributing any 
material to which they do not “materially contribute.”111 So, if there is 
anything that has eaten the law in this area, it is section 230 doctrine—a 
creation of legislators and judges, not artificial intelligence.112 
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Wu devotes one paragraph of his essay to section 230.113 He could be 
forgiven for this relative inattention. The debate that the statute’s mere 
mention generates in some circles these days is often hyperbolic and 
sometimes dispiriting and vitriolic—it tends to emit more heat than light. 
The debate in vogue in Washington, D.C., particularly among right-wing 
conservatives, is that section 230 requires political neutrality or that it 
immunizes social media companies from discriminating against conserva-
tive viewpoints.114 Neither is a correct reading of the statute or the 
doctrine.115 But, as challenging as discussion about the topic may often 
be, the doctrine is essential to understanding the basic contours of the 
current state of affairs. No matter one’s view of it, section 230 doctrine 
should be part of any serious consideration of whether judicial adjudica-
tion in this area is receding. 
It is not obvious here whether Wu’s silence on current section 230 
doctrine reflects his support for or indifference about it. Anyway, his rela-
tive inattention to the immunity here is glaring in light of the essay’s 
premise about human adjudication. If I were asked to provide a revision 
to Wu’s essay title (and no one has asked me, of course), it would be to 
offer a qualification: AI is eating the law, and “Congress and jurists have 
let it.” 
Section 230’s stated purpose is “to preserve the vibrant and competi-
tive free market that presently exists for the Internet and other interac-
tive computer services, unfettered by Federal or State regulation.”116 
Congress set out the workings of the statute in section 230(c). First, un-
der section 230(c)(1), Congress sought to ensure that courts would not 
“treat[]” online intermediaries as “publishers or speakers” of their users’ 
content.117 This language was meant to head off judicial application of 
defamation law to online platforms.118 Under traditional defamation 
principles, publishers are as liable for disseminating unlawful speech as 
the original speaker.119 Section 230 removes that duty for “interactive 
computer services” on the theory that the massive amounts of content 
that flowed through online services (back then, think electronic bulletin 
boards, online chatrooms, and newsgroups) are impossible to monitor 
without substantially curtailing the distribution of lawful user-generated 
content—the application of defamation law would have the effect of 
                                                                                                                           
 113. See Wu, AI Eat the Law, supra note 1, at 2009. 
 114. See Sarah Jeong, Politicians Want to Change the Internet’s Most Important Law. They 
Should Read It First., N.Y. Times (July 26, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/26/ 
opinion/section-230-political-neutrality.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
 115. Id. 
 116. 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(2) (2012). 
 117. Id. § 230(c)(1). 
 118. See Zeran v. AOL, 129 F.3d 327, 330–31 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding that section 230 
was intended to shield computer service providers from publisher liability). 
 119. See id. at 331 (outlining “the strict liability standard normally applied to original 
publishers of defamatory statements”). 
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“chilling” lawful online speech.120 That is why, the courts have explained, 
under the statute, an intermediary may only be held liable if it somehow 
“creat[es] or develop[s]” the offending content.121 
Congress signaled the second notable feature of the statute in the 
header of section 230(c): “Protection for ‘Good Samaritan’ Blocking and 
Screening of Offensive Material.”122 Here, legislators created a safe har-
bor that was to shield from liability “interactive computer services” that 
voluntarily take good faith efforts to block or take down objectionable 
content.123 One straightforward reading of the statute would presume 
that this subsection, section 230(c)(2), is actually the operative provision, 
and that section 230(c)(1), described above, only removes the presump-
tion that publishing torts apply as usual to online intermediaries.124 But 
the courts have since read section 230 so broadly as to effectively write 
the Good Samaritan safe harbor at section 230(c)(2) out of the statute. 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Zeran v. AOL in 1997 
was the first federal appellate court to apply the provision.125 There, the 
panel concluded that the statute protected AOL from being held liable 
for its repeated distribution of an anonymous person’s defamatory posts 
about the plaintiff.126 In an opinion that would set the tone for the doc-
trine for the next two decades, Judge Harvey Wilkinson held that, under 
section 230, America Online had no obligation to block or take down the 
unlawful content, even when, acting as a distributor, it had knowledge 
that the inflammatory material at issue was defamatory.127 
                                                                                                                           
 120. Felix T. Wu, Collateral Censorship and the Limits of Intermediary Immunity, 87 
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 121. 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3). See generally Fair Hous. Council v. Roommates.com, LLC, 
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 124. See Sylvain, Design Duties, supra note 112, at 258 n.298 (discussing Doe v. GTE 
Corp., 347 F.3d 655 (7th Cir. 2003)). 
 125. 129 F.3d 327; see also Davis R. Sheridan, Zeran v. AOL and the Effect of Section 
230 of the Communications Decency Act upon Liability for Defamation on the Internet, 
61 Alb. L. Rev. 147, 151 (1997) (“In Zeran, the first reported case to consider the scope of 
the immunity conferred by § 230, the court held that § 230 also confers upon interactive 
computer services immunity from liability as distributors.”). 
 126. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 332–33. 
 127. Id. at 333. 
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The Zeran opinion and those that have followed have set out an 
exceptional regulatory arrangement. Courts have applied Zeran to a 
variety of cases involving online material, reaching conclusions that they 
would never reach in cases involving broadcasters, newspapers, or other 
traditional media. For example, they have immunized an openly miso-
gynistic blog that encourages visitors to post and comment on defam-
atory and otherwise degrading material about specific young women.128 
They have immunized an online dating service that did nothing to forbid 
a user from creating false and lurid profiles of an ex-lover, even after the 
victim, a nonuser, had sent repeated requests to have the site take the 
material down.129 Courts also have applied the immunity well outside of 
the defamation setting, granting it, for example, to a classifieds page that 
knowingly facilitated sex trafficking130 and an online marketplace that is 
an overt platform for the purchase and sale of unregistered automatic 
rifles on its site.131 
We might assume that these “interactive computer services” are ex-
actly what the drafters of the immunity meant to shield. The premise of 
the broad protection, after all, was to allow online intermediaries to be 
“unfettered” conduits for the public distribution of user-generated con-
tent—that consumers would be the best adjudicators of the content they 
want.132 In the late 1990s and early 2000s, when the federal courts forged 
the doctrine’s contours, it seemed sensible to insulate the new tech-
nology from legal regulation if doing so would ensure that the user-
generated content could flow freely.133 
Today, however, intermediaries are far more than simple publishers 
or distributors of third-party content. And users appear to have few con-
straints on what they are willing to post or consume. Online platforms 
have been able to experiment with all kinds of business designs that elicit 
the worst sorts of expressive conduct and transactions.134 They can do 
this, in spite of the Good Samaritan language in the statute, without ever 
even pretending a “good faith” interest in moderating such conduct and 
transactions.135 Today, as I explain in Part III, they carefully engineer and 
curate our online experiences; they elicit, collect, harvest, sort, analyze, 
and repurpose consumer data in service of their own business objectives 
and the prerogatives of the advertisers who have come to rely on them.136 
                                                                                                                           
 128. See Jones v. Dirty World Entm’t Recordings, 765 F.3d 398, 414–15 (6th Cir. 2014). 
 129. See Herrick v. Grindr, 756 F. App’x 586, 588–89, 591 (2d Cir. 2019). 
 130. See Jane Doe No. 1 v. Backpage.com, 817 F.3d 12, 16–17, 24 (1st Cir. 2016). 
 131. See Daniel v. Armslist, LLC, 926 N.W.2d 710, 714–15, 727 (Wis. 2019). 
 132. 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(2) (2012). 
 133. See Zeran v. AOL, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997). 
 134. See supra notes 128–131 and accompanying text. 
 135. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c). 
 136. Sylvain, Design Duties, supra note 112, at 205–07 (describing how online plat-
forms have become more than neutral conduits for information and now are commercial 
enterprises profiting from users’ conduct and information). 
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This political economy of networked information flows looks nothing 
like the internet of twenty years ago. And now that just half a dozen or so 
companies administer most of our online activity, we are a far cry from 
the days of a user-powered internet populated by a diversity of online 
forums, news groups, and electronic bulletin boards. 
It is also not at all clear that a laissez-faire approach to online plat-
form moderation was ever a good idea to begin with. The logic for open 
and robust debate does not require that every possible thought find 
expression.137 The problem with the blanket immunity is that, pursuant 
to section 230 immunity, platforms need not mind laws that forbid harm-
ful expressive conduct, even as they are the best situated to do so.138 
Never mind the generic safety of online platforms for all users. An unreg-
ulated speech environment generally has devastating effects on the peo-
ple and groups for whom legal protections exist. There are, of course, 
the people for whom judicial recourse is effectively a dead letter as a gen-
eral matter under the current doctrine.139 But, to the extent public laws 
exist to remedy extant information asymmetries, the people whom such 
laws are supposed to protect—those who are likeliest to be harmed be-
cause of inequality and other background sociopolitical and economic 
structures—become more exposed to harm if intermediaries presume no 
native legal or ethical duty to mind third-party content.140 Online, these 
harms metastasize rapidly.141 Individual retail consumers are more vulner-
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 141. Olivier Sylvain, Discriminatory Designs on User Data, Knight First Amendment 
Inst. (Apr. 1, 2018), https://knightcolumbia.org/content/discriminatory-designs-user-data 
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able to deceptive advertisements.142 Voters are misinformed about candi-
dates.143 Investors are likelier to get duped into purchasing stocks.144 
Members of historically subordinated groups—women, people of color, 
disabled people, members of the LGBTQ community—are more vulner-
able to harassment and discrimination.145 The ways in which the Big Tech 
companies design their services, if unchecked, could compound these 
conditions of inequality.146 
These critics of section 230 doctrine do not propose, as some skep-
tics have supposed,147 that platforms favor certain kinds of speech over 
others, which would violate the First Amendment if state action were in-
volved (which isn’t the case here). Rather, this argument recommends 
that section 230 doctrine incorporate laws and regulations that protect 
against harms that worsen extant inequalities. It is in this vein that, in 
recent years, scholars have written about the perils of the sweeping 
protection under section 230. Mary Anne Franks, Danielle Citron, 
Benjamin Wittes, and Ann Bartow in particular have described the ways 
in which the current doctrine exposes young women, who are the likeli-
est victims of nonconsensual pornography, to greater injuries.148 I have 
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Duties, supra note 112, at 208–10. 
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(Apr. 6, 2018), https://knightcolumbia.org/content/err-platform [https://perma.cc/NZ6H-
CN4U]. 
 148. Mary Anne Franks, The Cult of the Constitution 127–28 (2019) (arguing that 
current First Amendment doctrine artificially entrenches inequality because it limits 
2019] RECOVERING TECH'S HUMANITY 275 
 
written, moreover, about the ways in which the doctrine should not be so 
forgiving of platform designs that facilitate discrimination against histori-
cally subordinated or vulnerable users.149 
Online content moderation, an aspect of Big Tech companies’ 
industrial design, should be treated for what it is: a managerial choice 
about how these companies control and consolidate information flows to 
achieve their commercial objectives. But, today, the blanket immunity 
has effectively given online platforms license to disregard expressive con-
duct that perpetuates or deepens harms for which policymakers have 
drafted legal protections.150 
V. WHEN LAW RULES, PLATFORMS WILL FOLLOW 
Several developments of the past couple of years suggest that 
meaningful reform of section 230 doctrine is afoot. In 2018, Congress 
enacted exceptions to the immunity for intermediaries that knowingly 
facilitate sex trafficking.151 Legislators acted in response to news about 
online marketplaces and classifieds (namely, Backpage.com) that had 
been engaged in the practice.152 The statute’s wording is vulnerable to 
constitutional challenge, but it demonstrates that legislators are prepared 
today to narrow the protection under the statute in ways that did not 
seem possible just five years ago. 
Other recent opinions and litigation suggest that, looking forward, 
platforms’ respective designs on user content and data may not remain as 
immune from judicial scrutiny as they have been.153 The civil rights cases 
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mentioned above against Facebook’s administration of its Ad Manager are 
among them. Civil rights groups and aggrieved users filed five separate 
lawsuits between late 2016 and 2018, in the wake of excellent reporting 
by Julia Angwin and Terry Paris Jr. at ProPublica about “machine bias” in 
Facebook’s advertising service.154 The cases ended in a settlement in 
March 2019, just a few weeks after oral arguments in federal district 
courts in New York and California, so there is not yet a full judicial opin-
ion on point.155 
Plaintiffs’ complaints generally alleged that Facebook had developed 
unlawful content within the meaning of section 230 by creating suspect 
classifications (such as racial “affinity” groups and age) that the company 
would, in turn, present to advertisers as characteristics on which those 
advertisers could find prospective buyers.156 This allegation would be 
enough, one would think, to raise eyebrows because civil rights laws flatly 
prohibit advertisements that hint at such classifications or proxies for 
them.157 The complaints invoked some of the same logic on which the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that a section 230 de-
fense did not block the trial court’s consideration of dropdown menus 
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B5WV]; Facebook Settlement, Nat’l Fair Hous. All., https://nationalfairhousing.org/ 
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on Roommates.com that elicited users’ gender, sexual orientation, and 
family status, as well as their preferences for roommates on those 
dimensions.158 
Plaintiffs in the most recent cases alleged more, however. Among 
other things, they argued that Facebook distributed advertisements to 
“lookalike” demographic groups that its algorithms predicted would be 
interested.159 That is, Facebook took steps to reach prospective buyers 
and renters who were otherwise unknown or unavailable to advertisers in 
order to better discriminate between buyers.160 The March 2019 settle-
ment effectively ended all of this.161 And, while we will never know for 
sure, it is reasonable to suspect that Facebook settled the case because, 
quite unlike typical section 230 motions to dismiss that social media com-
panies successfully file,162 this was a close call. The U.S. Department of 
Housing and Urban Development filed its own suit against Facebook days 
after the company settled with the civil rights plaintiffs.163 It, too, is fo-
cused on the ways in which Facebook facilitates racial discrimination in 
housing markets in the design of its Ad Manager.164 This suit makes 
sense, since, no matter whether Facebook abides by the March 2019 
settlement terms, their algorithms might still revert to discriminatory 
advertisement distribution patterns.165 Anyway, the reviewing court might 
very well have to entertain the section 230 defense anew and, this time, 
reach a decision. 
Other relatively recent cases that did reach judicial opinion are even 
more suggestive that courts’ solicitude for online intermediaries under 
section 230 doctrine is waning. This past summer, for example, the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Oberdorf v. Amazon rejected 
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Amazon’s section 230 defense to a product liability claim.166 Plaintiff, an 
Amazon user who blamed the online retailer for a defective leash 
manufactured by someone else, alleged that Amazon was not entitled to 
the immunity because the injuries she suffered arose from Amazon’s ac-
tions as a seller, not as a publisher.167 The panel agreed, explaining that 
Amazon “plays a large role in the actual sales process. This includes 
receiving customer shipping information, processing customer payments, 
relaying funds and information to third-party vendors, and collecting the 
fees it charges for providing these services.”168 The panel remanded the 
case to the lower court to identify the claims in plaintiff’s complaint that 
alleged “actions or failures in the sales or distribution processes,” rather 
than the editorial “failure to warn.”169 That is, plaintiff’s complaint would 
survive Amazon’s motion to dismiss if the trial court finds that its allega-
tions are addressed “to selling, inspecting, marketing, distributing, failing 
to test, or designing.”170 Just weeks later, a federal trial court in the 
Western District of Wisconsin cited the Third Circuit’s opinion to reject 
Amazon’s section 230 defense in another strict liability claim under a 
similar state law theory of product liability.171 
The Amazon opinions align with an emergent line of cases, starting 
with Barnes v. Yahoo, an opinion seemingly written for law school teach-
ing, in which the court rejected a section 230 defense.172 This was an-
other case involving an aggrieved ex-lover who created false and lurid 
accounts of a former lover.173 Yahoo failed to take the material down after 
hearing repeatedly from plaintiff.174 What is worse, on one occasion, it 
failed to take down the material even after one of its representatives told 
plaintiff that the company would do so.175 Plaintiff alleged two claims: 
negligence for failure to block or take down the profiles, and promissory 
estoppel for lulling plaintiff into thinking Yahoo would take the profile 
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down.176 The court rejected plaintiff’s first claim on section 230 grounds, 
holding that it was a defamation claim masquerading as a negligence 
claim.177 But it rejected the motion to dismiss as to the second claim.178 
Plaintiff’s alleged injury, the court explained, arose from Yahoo’s 
promise that it would take the material down, which was an intervening 
decision to “de-publish.”179 
Courts have repeatedly cited the Barnes case to distinguish between 
claims addressed to publishing and those arising from nonpublishing 
events. The Tenth Circuit cited Barnes to reject a section 230 defense in 
Federal Trade Commission v. Accusearch.180 There, the defendant company 
operated an elaborate business that provided paying consumers with the 
private confidential telephone records of anyone by actively enlisting 
third-party researchers to find such records in violation of privacy law.181 
Similarly, in Federal Trade Commission v. LeadClick Media, the Second 
Circuit, citing Barnes, rejected the defendant’s section 230 defense be-
cause the defendant orchestrated the development of “fake news” on 
sites across the web about weight loss products.182 The LeadClick Media 
panel held that the section 230 defense did not apply because the FTC’s 
allegations arose from the defendant’s deceptive actions as the manager 
of an advertising network, not as a publisher.183 And, in Airbnb v. San 
Francisco, the Northern District of California found that the city’s ordi-
nance barring booking services for short-term rentals that are not regis-
tered with the city does not violate section 230 doctrine.184 Citing Barnes, 
the court explained that the law imposes requirements that are unrelated 
to Airbnb’s editorial decision about which units to make available to 
guests.185 
Barnes and its progeny have added important texture to section 230 
doctrine. They, along with the Facebook Ad Manager settlements, are 
also more than suggestive that the courts’ laissez-faire approach to plat-
form moderation is not inevitable. Indeed, by the looks of it, judges’ ear-
lier reticence may be giving way to serious but ordinary judicial scrutiny. 
The systems and business designs that online companies develop and 
operate are being seen for what they are: tools and techniques for 
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advancing online companies’ own commercial mission, not a pristine 
public-regarding exercise to promote “safe” or “healthy” conversations. 
What would the world look like if section 230 doctrine were not the 
obstacle to litigation that it has been for the past two decades? At a mini-
mum, judges would be less likely to grant section 230 motions to dismiss 
(or, as in Airbnb v. San Francisco, declaratory judgment claims brought 
pursuant to that provision). This means more discovery which, in turn, 
will give courts the occasion to scrutinize the ways in which platforms de-
velop content review procedures and the incentives for doing so, as well 
as the design and operation of screening technologies and the guidelines 
that moderators must implement. In these, courts might find evidence of 
overt collaboration between platforms and “content developers.”186 Or 
they might find that platform managers set out to repurpose user infor-
mation for their own commercial gain, at the expense of those very 
users.187 
Courts would probably also seriously consider the merits of any 
given plaintiff’s legal claims and theories about causation and harm. That 
is, they will draw on time-tested concepts of legal responsibility that the 
prevailing section 230 doctrine has shut out of consideration. In such a 
world, courts would no doubt begin to help reach an equilibrium be-
tween the industrial interest in innovation on the one hand and legal 
protections for consumers and historically subordinated groups on the 
other. The very notion that such interventions would be available is 
surely worrying to the champions of unfettered internet freedom.188 But, 
at least then, courts would begin to deliberate at trial and on appeal 
about how far platforms may go in their designs on user-generated con-
tent and data. 
We might learn, for example, that, to best protect consumers, online 
platforms ought to consider the regulatory impacts of any update or new 
service before its public release. Over the past couple of years, scholars 
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and advocates have proposed, for example, “algorithmic impact assess-
ments.”189 One such proposal, although addressed to the specific case of 
government procurement of such systems (say, again, for pretrial 
detention determinations or school placement), sets out procedures for 
public notice and evaluation of any new system’s impact on different 
communities.190 Other similar proposals recommend that government 
administrators of automated decisionmaking systems explain the 
processes that produce the system’s design, as well as its outcome.191 
While, again, these proposals generally address government 
administration of such systems, such an approach could also apply to 
platforms in areas where courts and policymakers have already imposed 
constitutionally valid limits on information flow, including consumer 
protection,192 civil rights,193 and securities law.194 In all of these 
circumstances, courts would not refrain from scrutinizing the inner 
workings—what I have been calling the “designs”—of the respective 
services. 
Critics might raise doubts about the courts’ institutional competence 
to fully understand this dynamic line of business. But this challenge 
would not be a new jurisprudential problem. To the contrary, this chal-
lenge really just revisits one of the most enduring questions about gen-
eralist judges deciding complex cases across substantive areas.195 In any 
event, there are too many cases in the recent past that suggest the oppo-
site.196 And, even if courts did not have the sophistication to understand 
the specific workings of platform moderation tools and techniques, there 
are institutional mechanisms and judicial doctrines to redress this chal-
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lenge.197 If agencies start playing a greater role in taking on online plat-
form moderation of content, without fear of blanket immunity, courts 
would abide by longstanding deference norms in administrative law 
doctrine.198 
CONCLUSION 
The big tech firms, policymakers, and courts are poised to reform 
the ways in which to govern social media content. The proposed changes, 
as varied as they are, will one way or another allocate responsibility be-
tween the stakeholders in new ways. This Response has argued, among 
other things, that any such reforms should not treat social media applica-
tions as pristine speech platforms for earnest democratic debate. Rather, 
in recognition of the work of many scholars, including Wu’s own impres-
sive work, I assert that reform should address social media companies as 
commercial enterprises whose priority is to maximize user attention and 
engagement for advertisers. It is for this reason, I assert, that policy-
makers should reject efforts to defer to the companies’ own automated 
decisionmaking systems for moderating content. These technologies are 
just one asset in the political economy and industrial designs of social 
media. They have not displaced the vital role that human labor and hu-
man incentives play. It is for this reason, I argue, that it is far too soon to 
write off untested but extant resources in law. 
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